Populism: a fallacy in a false dichotomy.

“ But Peter and the other apostles said: We ought to obey God rather than men. ”

Acts 5. 29.

1.— Introduction.
To those who keep an ear on modern political discourse, there is often much clout behind the assumption that there is a prominent dichotomy of financial interests in British society: between a wealthy few and a mass of disenfranchised people.  Common parlance has it that the latter are the sworn enemies of the former, and that the democratic process fundamentally reflects a desire for a perceived restorative justice in one form or another.  More than that, candidates from across the political spectrum present their case in various manifestos designed to appeal to such hysteria and ultimately court public favour.  

Such can trace their roots back to the majoritarian system of democracy, which holds that any governmental legitimacy is entirely derived from whichever political party can sustain more than 50 per cent. of public favour, as measured by voter turnout.  Those who cannot achieve such are designated inadequate to rule; their platform ignored, and their will trampled, there is a force into retreat.  A solution does not rest here.   

Consequentially, populism serves only to apply an approach fundamentally reductionist in its nature.  Political platforms are raised to simplistic rhetoric that appeals only to a shallow perception of the case at hand.  The establishment of a false dichotomy enables this, and the outcome is the logical extreme of such.  It leads only to despotism at its height.    

The point is not to ignore either the plight of the poor or the influence of a particular caste of an extremely wealthy minority.  Instead, the purpose will be to show how populism makes political chess-pieces of the condition of the poor, does little to restore a balance of justice, and instead appeals only to a general ignorance in the interest of securing a majoritarian consensus.  Instead, the solution lies in the organisation of sovereignty around something else. 

Watering down politics like this is fundamentally dangerous.  

2.— The civic constitution, according to Aristotle.
The very purpose of The Politics by Aristotle was to elucidate the appropriate forms of constitution for civic authority, and thereby for society.  The general understanding is that the constitution was the embodiment of a societal ideal: the good.  Upon this ideal, constitutions could gravitate and express themselves being positive or negative in their nature: for instance, Kingship is a positive, and Tyranny is its logical negative; Constitutional Government is a positive, whilst Democracy is its logical negative; &c.  Any civic authority, to be remotely successful, would need to practice the embodiment of these positive constitutions.

Nevertheless, there was no charge for a universal application of a single constitution.  Instead, it was recognised that each society had developed a multitude of unique classes of people, each with different interests.  It is important to note that, despite the difference of interests, there is not necessarily the implication of opposition.  A perfect example of the point is that trade and exchange represent different interests— one on the part of the buyer, and another on the part of the seller— and that these two are not fundamentally opposed to one-another; rather, they cooperate for a given purpose.  It is upon this principle that the good was considered operative and therefore just, placing the law as the sovereign arbitrator, rather than a person or people.  Reflections of this type of behaviour are witnessed today in the form of contract laws, for instance, which are signed to mediate the middle ground between two parties of different interests.  

It is toward the good that positive constitutions are established.  In the case of Aristotle's analysis, these take the form of: Kingship, Aristocracy, and Constitutional Government.  It is also possible that these themes may overlap in a single constitution, as they have frequently done historically and do so to some extent today.  Common to all three types is that civic authority is bound by law to act a certain way, and therefore subject to an objective, neutral arbitrator.  This is what enables the cooperation of otherwise divergent interests towards an establish end-goal.  In the case whereby decisions upon the law must be made— given that the law cannot functionally predict all potential outcomes, but only generally— the good constitution involves a civic authority which will consult the law and deliberate based upon that understanding.  Equally, these are considered most effective at the level of the city, which is considered the organic development from the village and, at the smallest level, the familial household.  

However, in cases of decline, there is witnessed simply the perversion of the good, and therefore of the constitution itself.  Divergence tended to signify opposition, rather than cooperation; one section of society establishes itself in opposition against the other; contingent interests are enabled to co-opt the purpose of civic authority simply for its own interest.  In this case, despotism prevails, be it on behalf of one, a few, or many.  In the first, Tyranny— the concentration of any and all sovereign authority in a King; the second, Oligarchy— the same calibre of authority vested in a few on the grounds of wealth, rather than merit; the third, Democracy— the will of the people as the presupposed source of all authority.  Common to all three of these corruptions is that law is no longer sovereign and therefore a restraint upon civic authority; instead, the place of one, a few, or many substitutes law as the sovereign, and can therefore act with more or less impunity.  It enables a greater calibre of despotism to occur as the restraint of law— that organic arbitrator of action and insurance of cooperation— is stripped bare and discarded.  

3.— The false dichotomy of today.  
In today's political discourse, there is more often than not a presented opposition of interests in the form of mutually exclusive, dichotomous social strata.  Usually, this takes the form of the wealthy minority against a disenfranchised majority.  The former are said to enact legislation predominantly in their favour, utilising their wealth as a form of influence over the life of civic authority; the latter, according to contemporary rhetoric, must use democratic mandate to legitimise themselves against this wealthy elite, or oligarchy.  In both cases, as established above, the will of individuals take precedence over law, and therefore both must lead to despotism.

Certainly, it is quite evident that oligarchs are enabled to co-opt civic authority for personal benefit.  No further proof is required than a passing consideration of how a select few international corporations are willingly bailed out on taxpayer money, labelled as too big to fail; indeed, they are almost safeguarded against the natural consequences of collapse and liquidation for poor or inadequate business behaviour.  Such favouritism goes against the very conduct of a soundly capitalist economy, and enables such giants to grow even bigger by permitting them to take to unnatural heights of risk knowing that they will be safeguarded otherwise.  The tendencies towards such a favourable position were even noted by Aristotle, (The Politics, p. 149,) saying: 

“

[Another] form of oligarchy arises when the owners of property are fewer than they were in the first form, and they property they own is larger.  Under these conditions, they have greater power; and they expect to get more advantage.

”

It would be fundamentally disingenuous to turn a blind eye to this phenomena as it exists in the modern day.  Ignorance of societal misfortune is no small matter.  An example of its occurrence has been noted above.  However, equally as disingenuous is the pretence that another corrupted form of constitution— in a type of democracy— is its one solution; in fact, any case whereby the law is substituted entirely by human authority is a fallacy.  Yet it is this platform which is levelled as the only solution in contemporary political debate: the choice is either to allow minority-oligarchy to happen, or conversely to vote for a party which will, in some sense or another, act upon the whims of the class presented as its eternal opposition.  The danger of this kind of thought manifested itself most extremely in the case of the French Revolution, whereby those deemed "enemies of the people" were those who last opened their eyes to see the blade.  

This is the fatal mistake of populism.  

4.— Populism is no remedy.
Most immediately, the concept of populism is a natural consequence of democratic majoritarianism; it is the logical extremity of its lifespan.  If the will of the people, so to speak, is considered legitimately expressed in any figure above the mark of 50 per cent. of the public vote, then surely, it will inspire those seeking it to chase that figure at all costs.  Largely, it is this kind of reductionist approach which has lead to the most turbulent alterations of social policy seen in recent years; it is to the benefit of this cause and this cause only that the dramatic loosening of citizenship qualification has occurred— it allows political candidates to garner a more impressive pool of potential voters if more can share in the right to political decision-making.  Such direction largely fails to take into account the merit and capability of an individual to make an informed, decisive judgement upon a political proposal, rooted with reference to law; instead, the interest is in making the numbers of voter consensus appear larger.  

With an exponentially-increasing number of people, all of whose decision is classified as sovereign in the eyes of civic authority, there is bound to be a corresponding increase in resultant complications.  Specific group interests are incentivised to pressure for change in their favour, and it is such change that impacts everybody else— especially in those cases where it is against their will— if the proposals achieve any figure over 50 per cent. of the vote.  By this consideration, such a decision is sovereign by sheer virtue of people mandating it to be. Laws are simply willed into existence, and other ones simply abrogated lightheartedly.  The mistake is that what is correct is determined to be relative to the number of people believing it to be so, rather than by making reference to an objective, predetermined law, and interpreting it through that scope.  Historically, this has been how any legal change has occurred— slowly, and with reference to an objective matter-of-fact.  

To this view, the excesses of populism do possess tendencies towards despotism, and as noted also by Aristotle: 

“

[Another] variety of democracy is the same in other respects but the people, and not the law, is the final sovereign.  This is what happens when popular decrees are sovereign instead of the law; and that is a result which is brought about by leaders of the demagogue type. 

Demagogues arise in cities where the laws are not sovereign.  [...] a democracy of this sort, since it has the character of a monarch [that] is not governed by law, sets about ruling in a monarchical way and grows despotic; flatterers are held in honour and it becomes analogous to the tyrannical form of monarchy. For this reason both show a similar temper; both behave like despots to the better citizens; the decrees of the one are like the edicts of the other; the popular lead in the one is the same as, or at any rate like, the flatterer in the other; and in either cause the influence of favourites predominates— that of the flatterer in tyrannies, and that of the popular leader in democracies.

”

Evident is it that not only does populism encourage the flagrant abrogation of laws in favour of new ones simply willed into existence, but equally, it means that the leaders themselves inherit a form of governance which encourages the further abrogation of laws.  No reference is needed, in fact, because the majoritarian consensus reigns supreme.  Leaders of this kind fall victim to the same principles of decline that has engulfed kings of the past.

A good example of these tendencies would be an instance whereby the rates of tax continually incline to a point where it consumes people's ability to conduct fair business— particularly of the small, local, or family-owned type.  Such has happened frequently in the past and still occurs in some instances today.  A general increase in taxes, usually called upon to promote economic equality, tends to find its way in populist manifestos in the name of justice; yet, they have the tendency to hit all classes of citizens hard, and certainly worse than the oligarchs at which they are aimed.  Known as it is that governments have the tendency to support the latter class of people, trying to tax them out of the money that has been given to them in the first place is the political equivalent of shooting oneself in the foot.  Equally in this case, there is absolutely no reference to the right to property or to the full fruits of one's labour,— especially to those middle-classes who would suffer for it,— or to any kind of transcendental laws of human nature; rather, the struggle is emphatically waged against those who have by simple mandate of a majoritarian consensus.  Cases of abrogation like this occur almost yearly in political manifestos, and usually receive popular support.  Still, this is just one way in which populism can easily grow into despotism.  

The largest issue with populism is that it assumes the established narrative of a mutually-exclusive dichotomy in its most simple case to be true.  Worse still is that it buys into it directly as a method of solution.  In other words, it is the people against a wealthy minority; the latter frequently ignore the supposed will of the people, and therefore majoritarian mandate should be enacted as sovereign to change things entirely.  Even by way of admission that this false dichotomy be true, there is the implicit ignorance towards a further class of people in society: the middle class.  

5.— The middle class as the solution.

Many instances of classical philosophy posit that, generally speaking, the best solutions tend to lie in the centre-ground of a dichotomy.  Marcus Aurelius, at numerous points throughout Meditations, poignantly asserted that a core part of dignity resides in temperance, modesty, and balance.  Similarly, Aristotle emphasises this principle by writing that happiness lies in the mean, or middle, reasserting his deliberations in Nichomachean Ethics.  In The Politics, this is expressed by writing that the middle-classes of a given society tend to represent that societal balance.  

To aid this claim, it is rightly asserted that the middle-classes are those who own a respectable degree of property, have some wealth, a strong educational background, and are also familiar with the demands of a working life.  Therefore, they are not so wont of possession that they do not have the time to dedicate to civic responsibilities; and equally, they are not so engulfed in a leisurely lifestyle that they exhibit the tendencies of the idle elite.  The fact that there remains a working life still practised assumes that these people are naturally inclined towards first consulting laws, outsourcing their immediate work in civic duty and deliberating solely upon that basis presupposed.  

One step further, it can be assumed that the middle-classes represent the functional best of a given society.  Presuming that a social economy is void of bureaucracy, it is fair to conclude that those who gravitate in the middle-classes— the qualifications are listed briefly above—  have attained their position through merit.  To even do so in a given society means that, to a large extent, one must have a large degree of familiarity with the culture and custom of their society, and thereby a corresponding degree of assimilation.  If again it is presumed that a social economy is void of bureaucracy, one would not go far at all on the basis of merit if their very being was the antithesis of the society in which they were trying to succeed.  In a society which is typically conservative of its foundational values, the hierarchy of merit works best as it enables those who labour to acquaint themselves with it to climb fairly.  

This tendency towards merit as the qualifying factor to governance contra-poses the contemporary tendency to assume that all are equally capable of making a suitable decision which impacts the lives of everyone else.  Anecdotally, the question could be asked, Would you entrust everyone else to vote upon a suitable surgeon to perform your operation? or, Would a ship's crew simply vote upon the captain, rather than defer to the man of most experience?  The point is that in most all other fields of practical life, we defer our confidence upon those who have most experience, given that they are acquainted with the laws of their field.  Likewise, doing so minimises the potential for collateral damage which is the result of poor judgement. 

Of course this is not quite the same, as political matters tend to affect everybody, whereas a surgery would not.  If anything, this should provide the case with more urgency.  However, the principle is the same inasmuch as there is the consideration that changes to one's individual life are surrendered to the whim of an entire body of people deemed sovereign, rather than by deferring to those of best experience on the matters of law. 

The principle is that anything enacted by a civic authority should be done in such a way that minimises collateral damage as much as possible.  It is considered that the middle-classes are the best-equipped to do such, as they are not swamped in the virtues and vices of those classes which surround them, and exist in their situation predominantly upon the basis of merit.  By occupying the societal middle-ground, they are prone to sympathies and considerations of those above and below them at the same time, and it could be logically concluded that they would be able to represent those tendencies in the most balanced manner.   

It should also be noted that, whilst this would not necessarily entail a strictly democratic form of governance, but rather to assert that there is a select class of citizens which it is proposed is best to lead civic authority.  Hysteria would have it that this would be an end to all forms of voting, and any kind of democratic tendencies within a constitution; this is simply not the case; rather, a system of voting would have to be devised with strict reference to a law, and thereby refined in its nature.  It would have to be a system of voting whereby nobody is considered sovereign, but instead, the sovereignty is transcendental law.

6.— Concluding thoughts.

So deeply rooted is the false dichotomy mentioned at the start that criticising democracy carries with it a baggage of contentiousness: if one does that, then they must necessarily be on the side of an oligarchical minority.  What other outcome could there possibly be? 

Although this essay has been somewhat brief considering the gravity of its enquiry, the purpose has been to deconstruct such a false narrative and, instead, show how the proposed solution rests outside of the rhetoric of populism itself.  As a matter of fact, populism as a solution equally leads to despotism as oligarchy does, because it places some body of people above a transcendental law and exponentially increases those who can be considered citizens, broadening the power base and thus introducing even more complications.  Logically, despotism must be the end, particularly if interest groups are enabled to co-opt the legislative function and abrogate old laws in their own favour, willing new ones into exist by a mentality akin to Might is Right. 

Instead of this, it is proposed that there is a select class most adequate to govern, and therefore representatives should be chosen from amongst the best of that class— ideally at a local and regional level only.  New, more refined systems of voting would have to be considered, which do not necessarily exclude public opinion but rather seek to consult it without making it the strict sovereign, as populism would.  To elucidate such an idea, a further essay will consult the current situation and posit new suggestions.

 + God bless